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The opposition sees 
only bad news, the 
Administration no 
mistakes
First 100 Days: Two opposing views
The first 100 days of Viktor Yanukovych and his team passed in June 2010. Al-
ready, their first steps have raised two separate debates that are virtually unre-
lated to each other. The opposition sees nothing good happening at all, while 
the new team is quite happy not to see its own mistakes. In fact, both points of 
view have some real basis.
Voters have positively responded to a number of actions taken by the new Ad-
ministration:
The revival of properly steering in the government system;
Improvements in relations with Russia which have made it possible to sign 
an agreement demarcating the Ukrainian-Russian border;
A quick adoption of the State Budget for this year;
The drafting of an Economic Reform Program and the launch of broad public 
debate on this issue.
At the same time, serious criticism and disquiet were caused by:
Illegal steps taken to establish the administrative chain of command and a 
monopoly over the court system;
The signing of the Kharkiv Accords with Russia;
Efforts to muzzle the press;
Growing administrative pressure on business;
Widespread use of administrative leverage (“administrative resources”) in 
the political arena;
The new Government’s approach to social and educational policy.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Program to the max
At the conclusion of his first 100 days in office, President Yanukovych provided 
a truly memorable occasion for Ukraine: the presentation of the Government’s 
Economic Reform Program for 2010–2014. This is the first Government pro-
gram that actually has something meaningful to talk about, containing a clear 
list of actions rather than a string of slogans and promises.
Still, the Program also has its serious faults, which could cancel out its indubi-
table success. The greatest of this is the separation of economic reforms from 
administrative reform of the very government bodies in charge of economic 
policy. The reforms intended to modernize the public administration system 
will be ready only this fall, whereas the program of economic reforms for 2010-
2014 is already a go.
In order to fulfill the objectives of the Program, there are plans to change legis-
lation, but this is only presented as a series of bills planned for adoption, rather 
than an actual plan of legislative initiatives pointing to what exactly needs to 
be canceled, approved or changed. The planned changes in law also have no 
proper institutional and fiscal underpinnings, that is, of the three necessary 
components for developing state policy (legislation, institutions, funding), the 
Program only has one (legislation).
One of the big problems in the Economic Reform Program for 2010-2014 is 
the lack of priorities. Fully 17 substantial reforms in nearly every sphere of the 
economy are proposed for the next five years—a completely unrealistic goal. In 
short, the Program is impossible to actually carry out.
Tax Code: A wake-up call for business
The draft Tax Code that passed first reading in the Verkhovna Rada in June 
faced serious resistance from the opposition, business and civil society. It was 
sharply criticized for increasing the tax burden on business, especially SMEs, 
and for granting the State Tax Administration unprecedentedly broad powers 
to repress taxpayers. The risk that the STA could be used not just for its “desig-
nated purposes” but as a political tool to put pressure on any opposition roused 
particular concern.
The tax holidays for SMEs promised by President Yanukovych have been kept 
in the new Tax Code but in a very marginal form. They will only apply to entre-
preneurs who “provide basic consumer services” and legal entities with turn-
over of less than UAH 100,000 per annum, which does not even cover a street 
kiosk in the countryside, far from any major highways. This raised a storm of 
accusations that the Government was making a farce of its campaign promises.
The fact that business reacted actively and collectively on one side and that the 
government was prepared to hold a dialog, on the other, has ensured that public 
The reform program 
contains a clear list  
of steps
The Program fails  
to establish priorities
The State Tax 
Administration could 
become a political 
weapon
Tax breaks are a farce?
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debate on tax reform is meaningful. The result was that the President declared 
the Tax Code not ready for signing in its current version and called for it to be 
substantially rewritten.
Nota Bene
8 June The Stockholm Court of Arbitration rules that NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy must 
pay RosUkrEnergo the equivalent of UA $5.5 billion. The Yanukovych Ad-
ministration offers no comments on the court decision while the opposi-
tion is sharply critical of what it considers a corrupt decision in violation 
of Ukrainian national interests.
18 June 6 deputies from Nasha Ukraina–Narodna Samooborona (NU-NS) join the 
“Stability and Reform” coalition as the ruling coalition continues to ex-
pand its ranks. Media analysts predicted that in a few months the coali-
tion could well have a Constitutional majority. This would allow the Party 
of the Regions to carry out its intentions to extend the powers of the 
Presidency and local governments, as well as to institute a second state 
language.
22 June A Constitutional Court ruling was published declaring that it would be 
unconstitutional to postpone local elections to 2011. This means that 
local elections will take place on October 31, 2010, as Party of the Re-
gions insisted. With the new Administration enjoying fairly high sup-
port among voters, it is interested in running these elections as soon as 
possible. These elections will enable the Yanukovych Administration to 
complete its governing chain of command and to begin to undertake 
politically unpopular reforms, such as increasing the retirement age and 
utility rates.
24 June Ukraine signed an agreement on a Free Trade Area with the European 
Free Trade Association, which includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland. According to Ukrainian Government officials, this 
agreement is an important step towards establishing a Free Trade Area 
with the European Union and could provide a kind of training ground. 
However, the agreement will actually not have much impact on Ukraine’s 
economy, because of a series of significant exceptions, such as that it 
does not provide for the removal of duty on automobiles, farming equip-
ment and chemical products. In any case, trade with EFTA countries is 
relatively small.
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Ukraine’s Choices
The last issue of Inside Ukraine was dedicated to Russia’s agenda on Ukraine. 
Should it be carried out without any change in Ukraine’s current position, the 
country will disappear as a player in the geopolitical arena and lose control of 
its own economy. Over the past five years, Ukraine rejected any joint projects 
with Russia, counting entirely on Euroatlantic integration. Meanwhile, no re-
forms took place internally, corruption mushroomed, and a rancorous conflict 
between the President and his Premier dominated the headlines. Russia, in the 
meantime, gave its support to a broadening anti-NATO and anti-European 
campaign for the hearts and minds of Ukrainian voters. In the West, Russian 
diplomacy chalked up major successes in establishing its terms for cooperat-
ing in areas of vital importance to the US and key EU countries. The main one 
was to choose between supporting the thorn in Russia’s side that was Ukraine 
and an opportunity to undertake critical joint enterprises with Russia. After the 
February 2010 Presidential election, the West no longer felt the unpleasant and 
hopeless need to support a dysfunctional Ukraine.
The country’s new political leadership has undertaken that which is no longer 
possible to ignore in a globalizing world. Integration, especially economic inte-
gration, has become the basis for relations among countries, a world trend. Ac-
cording to the WTO, more than 190 regional integrational agreements had been 
registered by the beginning of the 21st century, of which more than 130 were 
actually in force,. Moreover, more than half had been drawn up after 1990.1
Ukraine has little choice but to integrate regionally, and that means, first and 
foremost, integrating with the regional leader, Russia. For now, the country’s 
leadership has chosen integration rather than total opposition, but this is not 
the only choice facing the country. The next conscious step that Ukraine must 
make is to choose between passive and active integration.
Indeed, Ukraine has all the elements necessary to take up an active, construc-
tive, pragmatic integrational position.
1 Maurice Schiff and L. Allan Winters, “Regional Integration and Development,” World 
Bank (2003), Moscow edition in Russian, Ves Mir, 2005, p.17.
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Three integration models
Belarus: Head in the sand
The path Ukraine has gone down in recent months, taking many big and small 
steps, has already been beaten by its neighbor, Belarus. For that reason, moving 
down this path seems very easy and swift, as it doesn’t require much effort on 
Ukraine’s part—simply to change nothing: NOT reform the system of public 
administration, NOT establish rule of law, NOT take any politically unpopular 
steps, maintain the soviet-style top-down chain-of-command, neutralize the op-
position in the usual ways, and play the patriotic card from time to time, demon-
stratively standing up to Big Brother.
This kind of approach has assured stability and order in Belarus for many years. 
But foreign policy and appointments are supposed to be approved by Moscow.
Georgia: Feet first
Georgia is an example of what Ukraine might have become, had the country’s 
previous President demonstrated greater decisiveness and consistency in his 
policies. Georgia’s leadership has chalked up clear successes in improving the 
business climate and overcoming corruption, although the country has also lost 
a large chunk of territory as a result of armed conflict with Russia. The question, 
whether the one was the price of the other, is certainly debatable.
Kazakhstan: Standing strong
The average Ukrainian knows a lot less about stable, successful Kazakhstan than 
about half-swallowed Belarus or tattered Georgia. Nor is it a question of the per-
ceived gap that separates Ukraine from Central Asia, but the fact this country 
has become a regional leader without much fanfare, without exposing itself to 
resistance from Russia but maintaining good neighborly relations with it.
Kazakhstan has been an active participant in all of Russia’s integrational initia-
tives. It not only does not reject the embrace of its Big Neighbor, but actually 
meets it halfway, preserving its benefits in unchanged soviet rhetoric about the 
inviolable friendship of nearly half the population considers itself Russian and 
most citizens do not know the Kazakh language, from step-by-step reforming 
its own economy and energy sector, its public administration, and its armed 
forces.
One brilliant example of this kind of “oriental wisdom” is a decision by Nursul-
tan Nazarbayev to require all civil servants in Kazakhstan to demonstrate a com-
mand of the Kazakh language. On the face of it, this violates the rights of ethnic 
Russians, who constitute nearly 40% of the population, far more than dubbing 
Russian films in Ukrainian here does. Yet Moscow has been silent—because the 
whole world sees Astana as a close friend and reliable partner of Russia.
Integration between 
Ukraine and Russia  
is picking up pace
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Historical capital
The loss of sovereignty is possibly the biggest nightmare of Ukrainians. Even the 
national anthem talks about the unfinished battle for independence: “Ukraine’s 
glory and freedom have not yet died...” This kind of focus on its own statehood 
is hardly unfounded, given that the Ukrainian people have spent the majority of 
their history without it. Still, this not only does not place Ukraine’s existence as 
an independent nation in doubt, but is actually its greatest confirmation. A brief 
excursion in history makes this amply clear.
In one of his first decrees after the Battle of Poltava, Peter I of Russia banned the 
Ukrainian language. This same issue was touched upon further in more than 20 
additional ukases by Russian tsars. Why pay so much attention to the “dialect” 
of a non-existent people?
An equally convincing affirmation of the viability of Ukraine as a state is its abil-
ity to reinvent itself. Every time such an opportunity has arisen, the Ukrainian 
nation has established an unambiguously-named state on its own territory: the 
Ukrainian National Republic, the Ukrainian State under Hetman Skoropadsky, 
the Western Ukrainian National Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re-
public, Carpathian Ukraine, and, finally, today, Ukraine.
From the ruins of each subsequent empire, the Ukrainian nation has always 
come out richer. It is worth noting just the way Ukraine was transformed from a 
fragmented provincial farm belt in the Russian Empire into a formal, indepen-
dent, territorially whole and industrially developed republic of the Soviet Union 
with its own seat at the UN. Then, how Ukraine met the fall of the Soviet Union 
as one of the largest European countries, with its own nuclear arsenal, space 
technology and Crimea tossed in as a gift.
Status quo: Passive integration
Russia has been actively and consistently carrying out its own agenda, present-
ed in the last issue of Inside Ukraine, which consists of returning Ukraine to its 
orbit. The most fundamental points are:
The enshrinement of Ukraine’s non-block status and rejection of member-
ship in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
Gazprom’s control over Ukraine’s gas sector, especially the gas transport 
system (GST);
the revival of sector-based industrial conglomerates according to soviet prin-
ciples by merging specific branches of Ukraine’s and Russia’s economies;
Russian being granted the status of the second official language in Ukraine;
•
•
•
•
The Ukrainian nation 
has always emerged 
from the ashes of  
the empire stronger
Moscow sees Kyiv as 
being part of its sphere 
of influence
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the establishment of a single Orthodox Church in Ukraine under the Mos-
cow Patriarchate.
To have these conditions met, of course, Russia is prepared to pay. The most 
resonant example of this is the conclusion of the Kharkiv Agreement: the Rus-
sian fleet in exchange for gas. A less publicized example was an agreement on 
the atomic energy sector, where Ukraine gets outdated and overpriced technol-
ogy together with loans to build reactors. The high level of corruption in the 
Ukrainian government has only made it easier to reach such agreements and 
have them carried out.
Meanwhile, Russia steadfastly maintains its own principles, however flexible it 
may show itself as to methods for exercising them. Whenever one or another of 
Moscow’s plans suddenly run into a wall on the Ukrainian side, the wording of 
these agreements is very quickly and easily changed—as long as the essence 
remains the same. “You don’t want to merge Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy? 
Let’s not, then, and call it ‘organizing a joint venture.’”
The basis for Moscow’s integration plan is the principle of economic efficiency, 
which means that Ukraine’s economy will be subsumed into the Russian one. 
The decision-making center will be in Moscow. Formally, Ukraine remains sov-
ereign: it is completely “independent” when it comes to domestic matters, but 
is expected to freely share its resources with its northern neighbor.
For this scenario to come to pass, two conditions must be met: no actual reforms 
that might bring in European standards and a switch to “managed” democracy. 
The first condition suits Ukraine’s leadership just fine at this time and they are 
steadily working on meeting the second one.
Confirmation of the fact that Ukraine is currently moving towards this scenar-
io—or is allowing itself to be led down that path—can be found in any number 
of events even just in June 2010:
The passing of the Law “On the basis for internal and external policy in 
Ukraine,” in which Ukraine’s non-block status is enshrined and the removal 
of provisions in the Law “On the basis for the national security of Ukraine” 
regarding the prospects of membership in NATO;
The adoption in principle of the Bill “On the procedure for organizing and 
running peaceful events,” which does not meet international standards and 
has been severely criticized by civil society organizations;
A resolution of the Crimean Rada on granting the Russian language official 
regional status.
The policies of the current government are aimed at maintaining order and sta-
bility. This is impossible to properly achieve without extensive reform of the 
•
•
•
•
Russia wants  
to swallow Ukraine’s 
economy
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public administration system, the government machine, primarily in terms of 
bringing it in line with democratic governance and a market economy.
The Government will be unable to  maintain stability for any  length of time us-
ing repressive methods as this will only worsen the economic situation and cut 
into State Budget revenues. Crushing the Ukrainian language and gradually 
reducing the country’s sovereignty will inevitably lead to political resistance 
and social unrest.
Option 1: How to dismember a state
Fortunately, Ukraine so far does not have any hot spots or frozen conflicts with-
in its borders that might constitute a direct threat to its territorial integrity. Still, 
the risk that this country might split up has been brought up in more than one 
study by world renowned analysts, including Samuel Huntington, the author of 
the concept of the clash of civilizations.
This controversial American political scientist based his arguments on the fact 
that Ukrainians belong to two different civilizations: the Orthodox in the East 
and the European in the Uniate (Greek Catholic) West. He illustrated the break 
line between these two territorial parts of Ukraine with the results of the 1994 
Presidential election, when support for Leonid Kravchuk in western oblasts and 
Leonid Kuchma in eastern oblasts was 90%. The results of all the elections in the 
subsequent 15 years have only reinforced this conclusion.
Enough centrifugal trends, both in the West and in the East, have emerged in the 
years of the country’s independence for Huntington to declare that the Ukraine 
was quite likely to break apart. In another scenario described in details by the 
editor-in-chief of Limes, an Italian journal of geopolitics,2 Donbas and Crimea 
go to Russia; several western oblasts separate and, in one form or another, join 
the European Union; rump Ukraine remains as an ostensibly independent state 
that is under Russian influence. The inevitable result of such a scenario would 
be the disappearance of Ukraine as a geopolitical player on the world map.
The high-speed efforts of the new Administration to ensure rapprochement 
with Russia coupled with its restriction of democratic freedoms could well rouse 
equally strong resistance in regions that are generally anti-Russian. Political 
games with principles that are touchy for both sides, such as language or his-
tory, could push the pendulum of mutual antagonism to such a degree that the 
least pretext will be decisive and launch an irreversible disintegration. There 
are all-too many threatening signals of such an eventually:
The resolution of the Severodonetsk assembly that called on setting up a 
Northeastern Ukrainian Autonomous Republic during the Orange Revolu-
tion;
2 See http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartland/the-tsar%E2%80%99s-sabres/920
•
Centrifugal forces 
threaten to disintegrate 
Ukraine
Inside Ukraine #9, June 2010
11
The coming to office of political forces whose acknowledged goal is reunifi-
cation with Russia in local and oblast councils and the Crimean Rada in the 
2006 local elections;
A Decree issued by former President Yushchenko awarding Stepan Bandera 
the posthumous title of Hero of Ukraine.
Option 2: How to take the lead in integration
Ukraine is not afraid of getting closer to Russia and integrating with it. Mutual 
integration is actually the basis for international relations in the modern, global-
ized world.
Blind submission or knee-jerk resistance is not the best modality for communi-
cating with a country that is Ukraine’s strategic partner. What is more appropri-
ate is an active, constructive and pragmatic approach. In other words, Ukraine 
fully supports the process of integration with Russia and proposes its views of 
how this integration should actually take place.
Firstly, all integrational processes in any given sphere take place on the basis of 
a unifying political principle and not horse-trading over commercial assets. The 
EU’s approach to this is a good example, as today it constitutes the best worked-
out  model for supporting the interests of every participant in the integrational 
process. This not only gives the European vector—declared by the President 
to be key—some real meaning but brings both Ukraine and Russia closer to 
EU requirements by providing the conditions for them to participate in broader 
integrational projects. At the same time, the countries can join joint Ukrainian-
Russian projects as a guarantee that mutual commitments are carried through. 
If the gas transport system is going to be modernized, then that will only be with 
the inclusion of European partners.
Secondly, Kyiv becomes the center of all integrational processes and the base 
for carrying out joint projects. After all, this is where all the newly build inte-
grational institutions are located. The territorial principle for placing Kyiv at 
the center of integration is critical. Why should Moscow agree? Because it has 
no reason not to agree if this is Kyiv’s unwavering position, based on historical 
realities and European principles of integration.
Thirdly, the principle of mirrored commitments is applied. Ukraine has a fun-
damental position regarding the Ukrainian language as the only state language 
while agreeing, as Moscow requests, to ensure the necessary conditions and 
support for the Russian language and culture to evolve. For its part, the Russian 
Federation fosters an active policy regarding media, educational and cultural 
development in areas where there is a concentration of ethnic Ukrainians—
Moscow, Siberia, the Far East, Krasnodar Krai, Surgut, Tiumen, and Vladivo-
stok—by funding Ukrainian-language schools and media through the State 
Budget.
•
•
Ukraine is proposing 
its own principles for 
integration with Russia
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For the European Union, this kind of development would not only not lead to a 
rejection of Ukraine’s Eurointegration ambitions but, on the contrary, to a per-
sistent, steady transition to European standards. A country that is a regional 
leader and is actively working with one of the global centers of power is a much 
more desirable and interesting partner for both the EU and NATO, than a coun-
try that cannot cope with relations with its closest neighbor.
This scenario can be ensured in Ukraine because all the necessary conditions 
are in place: 
A consolidated, strong and effective government;
The ambitious goals set by the President and his party;
Openly declared readiness among the country’s leaders to undertake re-
forms;
Intellectual capacity to develop a new post-conflict ideology of statehood;
A high level of trust in the current government among voters;
Support from Western partners, who are not interested in seeing Ukraine go 
down the drain as an independent player.
Guidelines on safe integration
Playing out this last scenario is the only option Ukraine as to reach the goal set 
by its President: to become one of the Top 20 developed countries in the world 
over the next decade. For this, Ukraine needs to apply world practice and follow 
the ten commandments of successful integration:
Integration with wealthier and stronger countries is useful.
Joining forces with wealthier countries is more economically convenient than 
joining poorer ones. The benefits include greater investment and trade, access 
to cutting-edge technologies, and stronger domestic competition.
2. Economically convenient integrated associations are worth political 
consideration.
If an economic association costs more than it benefits, they can cause political 
losses as well. Economic integration more easily spills over into political inte-
gration than the reverse.
•
•
•
•
•
•
1.
A regional leader is a 
desirable partner for 
the EU and NATO
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3. Integration is a spur to reform.
Integration requires reforms. Otherwise, the effect could be counterproductive. 
Greece’s refusal to undertake macroeconomic reform after joining the EU con-
siderably intensified the country’s current problems. At first glance, this was 
not especially obvious, because accession itself ensured the country additional 
resources, including financial ones, that made it possible to postpone reforms. 
The consequences of this “do nothing” attitude for Greece became evident only 
in 2009-2010.
4. Integration strengthens national security.
Growing trade tends to increase economic interdependence among partner 
countries. Stable trade relations reduce the likelihood of military confronta-
tions, as they increase the level of access to strategic resources among the part-
ners and reduce the threat of trade embargoes. According to World Bank statis-
tics, a 6% rise in trade flows reduces the level of conflict between countries by 
around 1%.3
5. Integration increases investment inflows.
Integrated associations in general are able to attract more foreign investment 
into a region that is developing than any of the individual fragmented national 
markets could.
6. Integration encourages competition.
Integration should serve as an instrument to stimulate competition, including 
expanded competition on the domestic market.
7. Integration optimizes tax system.
Those countries for which sales taxes constitute a major part of public revenues 
are at greatest risk during integration. During the course of integration, these 
countries are forced to reform their own tax systems, including internal excise, 
turnover taxes, value-added tax (VAT) and so on.
8. Multiple integration is useful.
Prior to joining the European Union, Slovakia belonged to 9 integrated asso-
ciations; Czechia and Slovenia to 8; Estonia to 6; Hungary, Latvia, Poland and 
Romania, to 5.4
3 Op. cit., Schiff and Winters, p. 245.
4 Ibid., p. 106.
Integration requires 
reforms
More trade means less 
conflict
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9. Deliberate integration with predicted consequences.
A customs union can be more convenient than a free trade zone, but only when 
internal boundaries are effectively  dropped—which is usually the case—and a 
low, general external duty is set.
Having a free trade area could be more convenient than not, but only when it 
does not involve a large number of asymmetrical exceptions. Any integrational 
agreement must also contain clear mechanisms for settling disputes, otherwise 
it is not worth signing.
10. WTO does not protect from integrational mis-steps.
Since it defends the principles of global liberalization based on the most facili-
tating regime, the WTO forbids only certain destructive forms of regional inte-
gration. Integrated associations should be judged through the prism of national 
interests, not their compliance with WTO requirements.
National interests  
are the foundation  
of integration
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